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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 The State of Idaho appeals from the district court’s appellate decision 
affirming the magistrate court’s order suppressing evidence seized during a 
probation search of Santana’s residence.  
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 The parties stipulated to the following underlying facts at both the 
magistrate and district court levels: 
 On February 17, 2014 Bryan Santana was charged with 
Driving Under the Influence in Canyon County, Case No. CR-2014-
0003893.  The public defender was appointed on March 10, 2014.  
Mr. Santana entered a guilty plea on April 16, 2014.  He was 
sentenced on May 29, 2014 by Judge Robert M. Taisey.  Judge 
Taisey placed Mr. Santana on supervised probation for Driving 
Under the Influence for 6 months and for 18 months of 
unsupervised probation thereafter.  Judge Taisey also gave the 
probation officers 30 discretionary jail days.  The written judgment 
contained the following specific terms of probation: 
 
The defendant shall: 
 
1. If on supervised probation, immediately report 
to the Misdemeanor Probation Dept. [at address/ 
phone] and comply with all rules and reporting 
requirements pursuant to the Canyon County 
Misdemeanor Probation Agreement of Supervision, 
and pay a monthly cost of supervision fee as set by 
the Board of Canyon County Commissioners; 
 
2. Not refuse evidentiary test for alcohol or drugs 
requested by a peace officer, probation officer, or 
treatment provider.  All tests requested by probation 
officer shall be at the Defendant’s expense; 
 
3. Keep Court informed in writing of defendant’s 
mailing address and telephone number.  If on 
supervised probation, do not move without first 
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obtaining written permission from the probation 
officer; 
 
4. Not commit a felony or misdemeanor; 
 
5. Not consume alcohol and/or any other mood 
altering substance unless prescribed by a physician; 
 
6. Not operate a motor vehicle upon a roadway 
unless validly licensed and insured; 
 
7. Alcohol monitoring/electronic monitoring/ or 
GPS monitoring program at Defendant’s expense, if 
required by probation officer; 
 
8. Within 30 days enroll in and then complete 26 
hours of D & A [drug and alcohol] treatment, 20 hours 
of cognitive self-change, Victim Impact Panel and 5 
hours of motivation group. 
 
 The above terms were indicated by checked boxes on a 
standard judgment form, except for item 8 above which was 
partially hand-written on the judgment form.  There is a box on the 
judgment form stating “Waive 4th Amendment Search and Seizure 
Rights to law enforcement.”  The Judgment in Mr. Santana’s cases 
did not have that box checked. 
 
 Judge Taisey did not orally tell Mr. Santana that his 4th 
Amendment Search and Seizure rights were waived. 
 
 Judge Taisey did tell Mr. Santana orally: to report to 
probation and comply with all their rules, terms and reporting 
requirements, that he was not to refuse any evidentiary tests, that 
he needed to show up for his “'UA’s” [Urine tests] was to keep the 
court informed in writing of his address, was not to commit any new 
crimes, was not to consume alcohol or any other mood altering 
substance unless it was prescribed, was not to drive unless his 
license was valid and he was insured, that the probation officers 
may require an electronic monitor or alcohol monitor if they felt it 
necessary, that within 30 days he must enroll in and complete 26 
hours of drug and alcohol intervention, 20 hours of cognitive self-
changes, and 5 hours of motivation group. 
 
 Judge Taisey further said that he was putting Mr. Santana 
on supervised probation due to the “nature of the offense,” his “prior 
history,” the “amount of intervention being requested,” and stated 
 3 
that “the primary purpose [of the 6 months of supervised probation] 
is to make sure that you’re actively involved in the treatment 
regimen.”  On July 7, 2014, out of court, Defendant’s probation 
officer required him to sign an Agreement of Supervision.  Mr. 
Santana did not have an attorney with him at the time he signed the 
agreement.  He was not told he had a right to have an attorney 
present, or to have an attorney review the agreement prior to 
signing it.  The agreement was a form, this form is the standard 
agreement signed by all supervised misdemeanor probationers in 
Canyon County. 
 
 In pertinent part, the agreement stated: “I hereby agree and 
consent to the search of my person, automobile, real property, and 
any other property at any time and at any place by any law 
enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation officer, and I do 
waive my constitutional right to be free of such searches.” 
 
 In Mr. Santana’s case, the standard agreement had 
handwritten in, by Crystal Laleman, Mr. Santana’s probation officer, 
the terms: “Do not enter any business whose primary source of 
revenue is the sale of alcohol” and “No alcohol in the home or in 
possession.” 
 
 Mr. Santana signed the form agreement and initialed all of 
the standard terms, along with the handwritten terms. 
 
 On that same date, July 7, 2014, the Defendant signed an 
“Admission of Alcohol/Drug Use,” stating that he both used alcohol 
and marijuana on or about July 4, 2014.  Mr. Santana also signed a 
slip stating that he would bring proof of enrollment with “Four 
Rivers” to his next appointment.  Four Rivers is a business that 
offers drug and alcohol treatment.  Several days later, On [sic] July 
9, 2014, Defendant tested positive for marijuana use. 
 
 On July 21, 2014, at around 5:21 PM, Officer Tlucek of the 
Nampa Police Department arrived at 224 W. Dewey Ave. in 
Nampa, Idaho to assist two probation officers employed by Canyon 
County Misdemeanor Probation, Mary Gomez and Crystal 
Laleman.  Together, they searched the Dewey Ave[.] residence.  
Mr. Santana was not present and did not consent at that time to the 
search.  The search subsequently produced what are alleged to be 
various items of drug paraphernalia and marijuana.  Mr. Santana 
was subsequently charged with possession of drug paraphernalia 
and possession of marijuana. 
 
 4 
 On August 19, 2014 Crystal Laleman filed a Report of 
Violation in the Driving Under the Influence case (CR-2014-
0003893).  The Report stated that Mr. Santana had violated Court-
ordered conditions.  Among the violations listed were the following: 
 
1) The defendant failed to show proof of 
enrollment, attendance and/or completion of drug and 
alcohol treatment as of the date of that writing[.] 
 
2) The defendant tested positive for marijuana on 
July 9, 2014 (and attached test results). 
 
3) The defendant admitted the use of alcohol and 
marijuana on or about July 4, 2014 (and attached Mr. 
Santana’s admission). 
 
4) That on July 2, 2014, the defendant was 
charged with a battery (CR-14-0015343). 
 
(R., pp.122-126.) 
 The state charged Santana with two misdemeanors based on the search 
of his residence – possession of marijuana and possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  (R., pp.7-8.)  Santana filed a motion to suppress evidence.  (R., 
pp.23-35.)  In lieu of presenting live testimony, the parties stipulated to the facts 
as set forth above, and submitted briefs on the issue.  (R., pp.23-35, 47-70, 122-
126; 6/18/15 Tr., p.3, Ls.7-12.)  At a hearing to announce its decision, the 
magistrate court granted Santana’s motion to suppress the evidence.  (R., pp.74-
75; see generally 6/18/15 Tr.) 
 The state appealed to the district court, which, upon the submission of 
briefs by the parties (R., pp.71-73, 79-112), affirmed the magistrate court’s 
suppression order (R., pp.128-135).  The state timely appeals the district court’s 





Did the district court err in granting Santana’s motion to suppress 




The District Court Erred In Affirming The Magistrate’s Order Granting Santana’s 
Motion To Suppress Evidence Because The Evidence Was Lawfully Seized 
 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate court suppressed marijuana and drug paraphernalia 
seized from Santana’s residence during a search conducted by two probation 
officers and a Nampa Police Officer.  The district court affirmed the magistrate 
court’s determination that the search of Santana’s residence was unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, ruling: (1) Santana’s Fourth Amendment waiver 
(i.e., “consent”) in the Agreement of Supervision was invalid because the 
magistrate court did not order or endorse it as a condition of probation, and (2) as 
a non-consensual probation search, the search of Santana’s residence was 
invalid because, even if there was a “reasonable suspicion” evidence of a 
probation violation would be found, there were no “exigent circumstances” to 
justify the search without obtaining a warrant.1     
The district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s suppression order 
because (1)(a) the trial court’s probation order contemplated that Santana would 
be required to cooperate with the “rules” and “terms” of the probation department 
not specifically set forth in the court’s sentencing order – such as signing a 
Fourth Amendment waiver, and (b) even if the waiver was not authorized by the 
                                            
1  In addressing the “reasonable suspicion” ground for the probation search, the 
magistrate court did not base its decision, as the district court did, on the lack of 
“exigent circumstances.”  Instead, the magistrate court concluded that Santana’s 
admission to smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol, and his subsequent 
positive test for the presence of marijuana in his system 12 days before the 
search were “too remote to justify a search.”  (6/18/15 Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.5.) 
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court, Santana freely and voluntarily waived such rights to the probation officer; 
and (2) in any event, the search of Santana’s residence was justified because 
there was “reasonable suspicion” it contained evidence showing he was in 
violation of his probation.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s 
decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).  The 
appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  Id. 
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [this Court] accept[s] the trial 
court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the Court] 
freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  
State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 
C. The Trial Court’s Probation Order Contemplated That Santana Would Be 
Required To Cooperate With The Rules And Terms Of The Probation 
Department In Ways Not Specifically Set Forth, Such As Signing A Fourth 
Amendment Waiver 
 
 The district court concluded that, because Santana’s Fourth Amendment 
waiver was made only at the behest of the probation officer, without any 
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involvement of the sentencing court, it was not valid.  (R., pp.130-132.)  The 
district court stated: 
 The probation department agreement of supervision came 
after the terms of the probation were put into place.  It had no 
authority to impose additional terms or conditions onto the 
defendant that the judge did not impose.  The magistrate judge 
therefore correctly held that there was no validly imposed waiver of 
Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation in this case. 
 
(R., p.132.)  The district court’s determination that Santana’s probation officer 
obtained Santana’s Fourth Amendment waiver without any authorization by the 
magistrate court is incorrect. 
 First, it should be noted that the magistrate court’s written order does not 
say that its list of probation requirements is exclusive, much less that it precludes 
a probation officer from having Santana waive his Fourth Amendment rights as a 
term of probation.  (R., pp.123-124.)  Instead, the magistrate’s written order 
required Santana to “comply with all rules and reporting requirements pursuant to 
the Canyon County Misdemeanor Probation Agreement of Supervision” (R., 
p.123) without specifying or limiting what the rules and reporting requirements 
are.   
 In turn, the Canyon County Misdemeanor Probation Department 
Agreement of Supervision has ten general terms for probationers to agree to and 
sign (initial), the third of which states: 
          SEARCHES:  I hereby agree and consent to the search of 
my person, automobile, real property, and any other property at any 
time and at any place by any law enforcement officer, peace officer, 
or probation officer and I do waive my constitutional right to be free 
of such searches.        
 
 9 
(R., p.42.)  Because the magistrate court ordered Santana to comply with “all 
rules” pursuant to the Agreement of Supervision, and because one of the 
Agreement’s “rules” includes a Fourth Amendment waiver, the waiver was 
included as part of the magistrate court’s probation order.   
 Even if Santana’s execution of a Fourth Amendment waiver is not deemed 
a “rule” of the probation department, it is a “term” of probation requested by the 
probation department.2  As such, the magistrate judge embraced it as a condition 
of Santana’s probation when, according to the stipulated facts, he “did tell Mr. 
Santana orally:  to report to probation and comply with all their rules, terms and 
reporting requirements.”  (R., p.124 (emphasis added).)  Inasmuch as one of the 
probation department’s “terms” requires probationers to sign a Fourth 
Amendment waiver, the magistrate’s verbal order that Santana “comply with all 
their . . . terms” authorized his Fourth Amendment waiver as a term of his 
probation.   
 Based on the written and verbal probation orders of the magistrate court, 
the district court erred in holding that the Fourth Amendment waiver probationary 
term was invalid because it was not contemplated by the magistrate court.  
 Finally, even if this Court determines that the magistrate court did not 
authorize the probation department to require Santana to waive his Fourth 
Amendment rights, Santana’s waiver should still be found valid as between he 
and the probation department.  One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant 
                                            
2  The Stipulated Statement of Facts states, “The agreement was a form, this 
form is the standard agreement signed by all supervised misdemeanor 
probationers in Canyon County.”  (R., p.125.)    
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requirement is voluntary consent to a search.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 222 (1973); State v. Aschinger, 149 Idaho 53, 56, 232 P.2d 831, 834 
(Ct. App. 2009).  There is nothing that prevented Santana from voluntarily 
consenting to have a probation officer search his residence without court 
authorization.  Santana has not argued that he did not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waive his Fourth Amendment rights.  Assuming he did so only at 
the request of the probation officer, it does not alter the voluntariness of such 
waiver.  Even if this Court finds that the magistrate court did not authorize the 
probation department to require Santana’s waiver, it should still be deemed a 
valid waiver given by Santana to the probation department. 
  
D. The Search Of Santana’s Residence Was Justified Because There Was 
“Reasonable Suspicion” It Held Evidence Showing He Was In Violation Of 
His Probation 
 
 The district court also determined that, as a warrantless probation search 
without a Fourth Amendment waiver, officers were not only required to have a 
“reasonable suspicion” that evidence of a probation violation would be found in 
Santana’s residence, but also that there were “exigent circumstances” for not 
obtaining a search warrant.  (R., pp.132-134.)  The district court applied an 
incorrect legal standard – exigent circumstances are wholly irrelevant to this 
case.  Moreover, because officers had a reasonable suspicion that evidence of a 
probation violation would be found in Santana’s residence, the probation search 
was valid. 
 The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an 
individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy.  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
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170, 177 (1984);  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967);  State v. 
Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 716, 132 P.3d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 2006).  Thus, when 
moving to suppress evidence, the defendant has the threshold burden of 
demonstrating that his legitimate privacy interests were infringed.  Rawlings v. 
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980);  State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 162, 15 
P.3d 1167, 1170 (2000);  Hanson, 142 Idaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474.  The test is 
whether a defendant seeking suppression had a subjective expectation of privacy 
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.  State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 562, 
565, 961 P.2d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1998).  “Since an illegal search violates the 
rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or 
property searched, only those with such a privacy interest may obtain 
suppression of the fruits of the search.”  State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 780, 
963 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ct. App. 1998).  See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
133-34 (1978);  Hanson, 142 Idaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474.  To show a Fourth 
Amendment privacy expectation the defendant must demonstrate both an actual, 
subjective expectation of privacy and that such expectation of privacy, when 
viewed objectively, was reasonable under the circumstances.  Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979);  State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215, 222, 868 P.2d 1231, 
1238 (1994). 
 In State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 590-591, 314 P.3d 639, 645-646 (Ct. App. 
2013), the Idaho Court of Appeals further explained: 
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy 
against governmental intrusion.  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 
843 . . . (2006) (“[B]y virtue of their status alone, probationers do 
not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”); 
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United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 . . . (2001) (“Just as other 
punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms, 
a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that 
deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding 
citizens.”).  Thus, a probationer is subject to warrantless searches 
by a probation officer if that probation officer has a reasonable 
suspicion the probationer has violated probation.  Knights, 534 U.S. 
at 121–22 . . .; State v. Adams, 146 Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240, 
242 (Ct. App. 2008) (probation searches based on suspicion are 
reasonable “[e]ven in the absence of a warrantless search 
condition”).  In State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496–98, 148 P.3d 
1240, 1242–44 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the search 
of a probationer based on reasonable suspicion even though there 
was no Fourth Amendment waiver applicable at the time of the 
search.  In State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 748, 250 P.3d 796, 799 
(Ct. App. 2011), this Court recognized that “well-developed law” in 
this area establishes that probation searches may be conducted 
without consent when the officers are called to investigate 
reasonable suspicion of violation of probation terms.  Id. 
 
As the above passage in Ellis makes clear, the district court’s insistence 
that “exigent circumstances” must be shown in addition to a “reasonable 
suspicion” to justify a warrantless probation search is incorrect.3  Free review of 
                                            
3  The district court stated: 
 
 Where an individual is already on probation, the standard of 
“proximate [sic] cause” to justify a search upon exigent 
circumstances is relaxed somewhat, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
[868, 873 (1987)] . . . .  The standard is stated to be “reasonable 
grounds for suspicion,” – which is a lesser standard – but the 
element of exigent circumstances must still be present. 
 
(R., p.133.)  However, the only reference to “exigent circumstances” by the 
majority opinion in Griffin is in footnote 3, which states in relevant part: 
 
. . . nothing in the regulation or elsewhere required him to be 
advised, at the time of the request for search, what the probation 
officer’s “reasonable grounds” were, any more than the ordinary 
citizen has to be notified of the grounds for “probable cause” or 
“exigent circumstances” searches before they may be undertaken. 
 
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875 n.3.   
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the correct constitutional standard for a probation search – i.e., “reasonable 
suspicion” – to the stipulated facts shows the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate court’s suppression order.  See Faith, 141 Idaho at 730, 117 P.3d at 
144. 
 As a condition of his probation, which was ordered on May 29, 2014, 
Santana was ordered to “[n]ot consume alcohol and/or any other mood altering 
substance unless prescribed by a physician.”  (R., pp.122-123.)  On July 21, 
2014 – the day Santana’s residence was searched – there were two articulable 
(and stipulated) facts for the probation officer to rely upon to form reasonable 
suspicion that Santana was in violation of his probation:  (1) on July 7, 2014, he 
admitted he had used alcohol and marijuana on or about July 4, 2014, and (2) he 
tested positive for marijuana on July 9, 2014.  (R., p.125.)  These two facts 
provided reasonable suspicion that evidence of a probation violation would be 
found at Santana’s home. 
  As noted previously (see n.1, supra), the magistrate court determined that, 
regardless of whether there was a reasonable suspicion that Santana was in 
violation of his probation, the information providing such suspicion was stale by 
the time the search was conducted – 12 days after Santana tested positive for 
marijuana.  (6/18/15 Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.5.)  The magistrate court’s 
“staleness” determination lacks merit. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
there is no magic number of days before information becomes stale.  State v. 
Gomez, 101 Idaho 802, 808, 623 P.2d 110, 116 (1980). “The question must be 
resolved in light of the circumstances of each case.”  Id.  Additionally, if the 
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suspected illegal activity is “of a protracted or continuous nature, a time delay in 
the sequence of events is of less significance.”  Id.  In this case, the probation 
violations that were suspected involved drug use, which can be characterized as 
a crime of a protracted nature.  See State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 24, 56 
P.3d 780, 786 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that “[c]ertain nefarious activities, such as 
narcotics trafficking, are continuing in nature and, as a result, are less likely to 
become stale even over an extended period of time.”).  Additionally, the search 
occurred only 12 days from the time Santana tested positive for having marijuana 
in his system.  It was reasonable to suspect that Santana’s residence would 
contain not only marijuana, but also any non-disposable paraphernalia (such as a 
pipe or bong) used to ingest marijuana on or about July 4, 2014.    
 Based on these facts, the information known to the probation officers was 
not too stale to establish reasonable suspicion and, thus, they had the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to search Santana’s home. 
   
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order affirming 
the magistrate court’s order granting the motion to suppress and remand for 
further proceedings.  
 DATED this 4th day of August, 2016. 
 
 
      /s/ John C. McKinney_______________ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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